

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Donald Paschal

SUBJECT : Draft "USIB Policy Concerning Travel and
Assignment of Personnel with Access to
Sensitive Intelligence"

1. Per your request, the subject draft of a USIB policy paper on travel and assignment of personnel with access to sensitive intelligence has been reviewed.

2. Some questions arose during the review and comments are made applicable to them:

a) The paper is rather long. Areas that might be shortened have to do with the definitions and the statement of purposes.

b) The statement on page 4, paragraph 4(c), to the effect that restrictions should not exceed the period of the specific intelligence activities ongoing or planned, raises question. Could it be eliminated?

c) It does not seem appropriate in a policy statement to task an element of the USIB for actions in support of the policy. In this connection the material on page 5, paragraph 6 (a), (b) and (c) should be considered for elimination.

d) While the concept behind paragraph 6, page 5, is sound, it does not appear appropriate to specifically task the USIB Principals to develop implementation policies.

e) The final paragraph (page 6, paragraph 7) raises a doubt. The Security Committee does not want to give the impression that it is policing the community members implementation of USIB policy.

[Redacted Signature]

Chairman

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

25 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological Services Staff
Office of Medical Services

SUBJECT : Request for CIA Report on Risk
of Capture Program

REFERENCE : NIS Memorandum, dated 3 July 1974,
Same Subject (Attached)

1. The Chairman, U.S. Intelligence Board Security Committee has received the attached correspondence from the U.S. Navy representative, who is chairing an ad hoc interdepartmental working group to consider changes to extant policies related to travel to and assignment in risk-of-capture areas by personnel approved for access to sensitive compartmented intelligence materials. The Navy representative has asked for a written report concerning CIA's risk-of-capture training program-- specifications as to the report's content are detailed in the attached, which I understand has been coordinated with [redacted] of your office.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CIA Member
Security Committee

Att

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SUBJECT: Request for CIA Report on Risk
of Capture Program

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
1 - CIA Member, SECOM

1 - Chairman, Security Committee, USIB

1 - Secretary, SECOM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Subj: Request for CIA report on Risk of Capture Program

1. At the 26 February 1974 meeting of the Security Committee, you established a working group chaired by me to explore factors bearing on USIB policy concerning travel or duty restrictions for personnel with access to sensitive intelligence. Arrangements were made for

25X1 [] Project Officer, CIA Risk of Capture Program, to brief the working group on information gained through and conclusions drawn from that program. [] briefing was most helpful to us.

25X1 The working group unanimously concluded that an official report summarizing the points made [] would be of considerable benefit to the intelligence community in developing and applying security programs.

25X1 We therefore recommend that the Security Committee authorize and direct the CIA member thereof to request the appropriate element of CIA to prepare and issue for intelligence community security use a report on the Risk of Capture Program. The report should include coverage of:

a. A summary of relatively recent (past 15 years) experience on capture or detention of official U.S. personnel abroad.

b. A description of the extent to which hostile interrogators have attempted to obtain, or succeeding in eliciting, sensitive information from detained U.S. personnel, as opposed to attempts to compel agreement with propaganda statements or provision of basic biographic information.

Enclosure (2)

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c. An analysis of the techniques used by such interrogators in attempting to elicit sensitive information, and a description of means successfully used by detained Americans in resisting such attempts.

d. An analysis of the factors which apparently led some Americans to cooperate with their captors in providing information of value.

e. A description of any significant differences in detention and interrogation practices between different countries or geographic areas.

f. A summary of training programs in effect or planned to enable U.S. personnel being sent to high risk areas to resist interrogation effectively if captured or detained.

g. Any other "lessons learned" of security value as a result of their experience with the program.

[Redacted]

Working Group Chairman

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